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Abstract: Alarm management is a key component of the successful operation of a prognostic or 21 
health monitoring technology. While alarms can alert the operator to critical information, false 22 
alarms and alarm flooding can cause major difficulties for successfully diagnosing and acting 23 
upon infrastructure faults. Human factors approaches seek to design more effective alarm 24 
systems through a deep understanding of the contextual factors that influence alarm response, 25 
including strategies and heuristics used by operators. This paper presents an extensive analysis 26 
of alarm handling activity in the setting of a rail Electrical Control Room (ECR). The analysis is 27 
based on contextual observation, and the application of a time-stamped observation checklist. 28 
Functions, performance requirements and general operating conditions that influence alarm 29 
handling are presented, delineating the typical operational constraints that need to be considered 30 
in the design and deployment of asset-based alarm systems. The analysis of specific alarm 31 
handling incidents reveals the use of specific strategies that may bias operator performance. 32 
Implications for the design of health monitoring systems are discussed. 33 
Keywords: human factors, alarm handling, strategies, joint cognitive systems, work 34 
analysis   35 
 36 
  37 
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1. INTRODUCTION 38 
Highly sophisticated use of remote sensors has the potential to give control operators detailed, 39 
real-time understanding of the status of complex environments comprised of multiple assets. 40 
Continuous monitoring of these large asset bases is beyond the performance capabilities of any 41 
human operator. A common solution, therefore, is to use alarms to assist human operators in 42 
managing numerous sources of data by presenting audible, visual or haptic alerts to critical 43 
events. This applies to a number of rail related domains including infrastructure monitoring,  44 
vehicle asset monitoring and, the topic of this paper, monitoring of the power supply in rail 45 
Electrical Control Rooms (ECRs).  46 
Alarms range from simple prompts for an operator to carry out further actions, including 47 
making diagnoses, through to semantically rich messages carrying verbal, textual or pictorial 48 
information about the source or cause of the abnormality. With the shift to prognostic systems, 49 
alarms will move from informing the operator of a current or recent event (e.g. failure of a piece 50 
of infrastructure) to include anticipatory alarms that warn the operator of an emerging risk (e.g. 51 
potential failure or degradation of asset performance). The use of this kind of pre-emptive alarm 52 
is likely to be highly relevant to the future, predictive asset management and health monitoring 53 
system on the railways 
1
. 54 
Successful implementation of alarm display systems, however, is not straightforward. Poor 55 
alarm handling has been a contributory factor in a number of safety-critical incidents such as 56 
Three Mile Island in 1979 
2
 and the Texaco refinery explosion in 1994 
3,4
. In transportation, 57 
aircraft hazard reports confirm that alarm problems contributed to about 50% of all of the 58 
incidents recorded between the years of 1984-1994 
5
.  Other examples include the Ladbroke 59 
Grove train accident 
6 
(though see 
7
, for a different perspective) and the Channel Tunnel Fire 
8
.  60 
Major problems associated with alarm systems include alarm flooding, poor system state 61 
indication, poor priority management, nuisance alarms and false alarms 
3,5,9
. Research on alarm 62 
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design suggests many instances where alarms are irrelevant or present unnecessary duplication 63 
of information 
10
. Alarm problems are mainly rooted in some form of information complexity. 
11 
64 
listed the sources of complexity as:  65 
 Volume of information  66 
 Ambiguous sources of information  67 
 Unclear relationship between different information sources  68 
A significant effort has been devoted to exploring alarm design problems. Topics covered 69 
include alarm handling response times 
12
, direction of attention 
5,13, modelling the operators’ 70 
diagnostic procedures 
7,13
, information load 
14
 and assessing how informative and meaningful 71 
alarms are 
9
.   72 
15
 pointed out that, despite their great potential, complex control systems are most likely to fail 73 
during emergencies. This is partially due to inconsistency between the machine and human 74 
operators’ information processing and the fact that, during problematic situations, operators are 75 
more likely to use their knowledge-based heuristics rather than the pre-programmed 76 
instructions. When faced with a high degree of information complexity, heuristics are used to 77 
reduce cognitive load in order to overcome the shortcomings and make an optimised decision 
11
. 78 
16
 identified the strategies potentially applied by operators to cope with complexities due to 79 
information inefficiencies (Error! Reference source not found.). These are effectively 80 
shortcuts applied by operators that consequently risk making their decisions somewhat biased. 81 
(Table 1) 82 
Reason suggested that it is necessary to design a new generation of systems that incorporates 83 
basic human cognition at the outset. Hence, in these dynamic situations, merely looking at the 84 
stand-alone functionality of the system would not be sufficient; a more cognitive and contextual 85 
approach is required 
17
. This has also been advocated in the Cognitive Systems Engineering 86 
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approach 
16
 which emphasises examining technology and human working together as a single 87 
unit of performance. Identifying when and why coping strategies are applied, and how they may 88 
influence subsequent operator and system performance, requires an in-depth understanding of 89 
the work domain. Furthermore, in order to reflect these understandings in future design of the 90 
system, it is important to correspond each of the strategies to its specific alarm-initiated activity.  91 
The following paper examines the current application of alarms and the use of alarm handling 92 
strategies in the setting of rail power provision. Railway Electrical Control Rooms (ECRs) in 93 
the UK were originally integrated from a number of adjacent railway traction power supply 94 
systems. Since 1932, Electrical Control Room Operators (ECROs) have been responsible for 95 
remotely opening and closing electrical equipment, instructing staff on the operation of manual 96 
switches, and leading the maintenance and fault-finding of electrification distribution and 97 
equipment. It is a key strategic area for effective rail operations, necessary to ensure a 98 
continuous supply of power to the track. Therefore, it enables rail infrastructure managers (such 99 
as Network Rail) to meet their contractual obligations to provide an effective rail network for 100 
railway undertakers such as train operating companies. It is also safety critical, with electrical 101 
isolation being a key part of safe access to the track during maintenance, engineering and 102 
incident handling 
18
 in those parts of the rail network using electric traction.  103 
The paper presents an in-depth analysis of alarm handling at one specific control room that 104 
provides electrical power to key urban and suburban lines in the metropolitan area of London, 105 
UK. The work presented in this paper was part of a larger project to modernise, and potentially 106 
centralise, the rail electrical control function for the UK railways and is part of a larger strategy 107 
to centralise maintenance activities and control. The project is indicative of attempts to deliver 108 
future asset management control systems (see other papers in this volume). Prior work in the 109 
project had set out a general framework for understanding the requirements of joint human-110 
automation cooperation in rail intelligent infrastructure, based on interviews with senior 111 
stakeholders (see 
1
). Alarm handling was highlighted as an area for further analysis, leading to 112 
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the study presented in the rest of this paper. This study set out to capture the functions and 113 
processes of alarm handling and, in particular, the application of strategies for alarm handling, 114 
under the current ECR arrangements. While roles might change and technology might change 115 
an understanding of current behaviours is still critical and valuable. First, and pragmatically, the 116 
lessons of the past can be used in the design of new technology and, second, while 117 
responsibilities between automation and human decision making might shift with new 118 
technology, the nature of those decisions and the functional outputs of the ECR as a joint-119 
cognitive system will remain the same. 120 
The methods and results covered two strands of analysis. The first strand used observations and 121 
interviews to understand the underlying contextual factors – functions, performance criteria, 122 
alarm types, environment, and processes – of ECRs. This is critical to understanding the ECR 123 
environment as a joint cognitive system. The second strand used verbal protocols and an 124 
observational checklist to identify the sequence of activities as well as particular coping 125 
strategies that operators adopted during alarm handling episodes. Together, these two sets of 126 
analyses shed light on the factors that influence alarm handling in ECR, which is taken up in the 127 
discussion, and data collected went on to for form a cognitive systems analysis of rail electrical 128 
control alarm handling 
19
. The contributions of this paper are (1) In-depth description of alarm 129 
functions within rail maintenance systems environments (2) mapping of alarm handling 130 
strategies to stages of alarm handling to inform alarm theory and subsequently to design 131 
guidance (3) examples of methodologies for use by others wishing to take an operator-centric 132 
view of the design and deployment of future asset management technologies.  133 
2. METHODS 134 
Field studies are useful for developing an understanding of the domain in a comprehensive way 135 
20
 enabling researchers to identify significant issues in complex socio-technical settings. 
21
 have 136 
noted that structured field studies can interconnect with exploratory observational studies to 137 
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produce a deep understanding of user needs. However, when operators are conducting cognitive 138 
activities (i.e. remembering, monitoring, etc.), it is often the case that their thinking is not 139 
visible and observation of the responses alone is not sufficient to get a clear understanding of 140 
the activity. In other words, human behaviours, while interacting with cognitive systems, are not 141 
usually in the form of observable actions. Verbal protocol analysis 
22
 facilitates the capture of 142 
these mental processes whereby the operator explains their actions, either while performing the 143 
tasks or following the completion of the activity 
23
 but unstructured verbal protocols may not 144 
access important information regarding performance or concurrent activity. 145 
To address these needs, a two-stage approach was taken. Familiarisation through observations 146 
and semi-structured interviews facilitated an overview of the work domain and led to 147 
development of an observational checklist. The observational checklist was developed from 148 
series of open interviews with the railway electrical operators, this led to an understanding of 149 
the activities associated with alarm handling, particular challenges and artefacts adopted by 150 
operators during alarm handling. Such checklists have been used previously in signalling 151 
control environments 
Error! Reference source not found., 24
. A second round of observations was then 152 
conducted using the observational checklist, along with verbal protocol and video recording 153 
footage of operators handling alarms, to develop a fundamental understanding of alarm handling 154 
in the ECR.  155 
The combination of observational checklist data and verbal protocol allows an analysis of 156 
frequencies and sequences of events, with a simplified version of the 
26
 Alarm Initiated 157 
Activities Model used as a basis. The model developed by Stanton and Stammers includes two 158 
sets of events: routine and critical. When an alarm is generated, operators observe the reported 159 
warning and accept if it is genuine. Based on their understanding of a failure, operators might 160 
analyse, correct, monitor, or reset the alarm. If the cause of the failure is unknown, then the 161 
operator will conduct a series of investigations to diagnose the problem. Finally, they monitor 162 
the situation to ensure that the abnormality is dealt with 
26
.   163 
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2.1. DOMAIN FAMILIARISATION   164 
The researcher visited a specific Network Rail Electrical Control Room (ECR A) for two 165 
sessions (total of four hours) prior to the set up of the field study. The aim of these visits was to 166 
become familiar with the domain, to identify peak times as well as key artefacts used frequently 167 
while handling alarms to understand the potential risks of conducting a real-time field study. 168 
Unstructured interviews were performed with ECR operators to initiate an understanding of 169 
alarm handling activities and potential challenges. Operators were simply asked to talk about 170 
alarm handling and to identify issues affecting the performance, the process, the control room 171 
specifications and regulations. Moreover, having these two sessions prior to the field study 172 
helped the researcher to build rapport with the operators and ensure that they were fully 173 
informed about the aims of the study and various stages of data collection associated with it. 174 
The familiarisation visits led to an assessment of the resources required for the field study, and 175 
the design of the observational checklist.  176 
2.2. FORMAL FIELD STUDY 177 
2.2.1. PARTICIPANTS    178 
Six electrical control room operators in ECR A participated in the study. They were all male 179 
with a mean age of 51 years. According to Network Rail’s grading system, which refers to 180 
operators’ years of experience, qualifications and training, participants were all considered to be 181 
competent. They were approached, briefed about the research and agreed to participate in the 182 
study. Participants were assured about the issues associated with data confidentiality and 183 
anonymity. Data were recorded on a basis of the number of alarms generated, not on the basis of 184 
the individual attending to them. 185 
2.2.2. APPARATUS     186 
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A Sony™ digital video recorder was used to record the alarm handling process from the 187 
moment the audible siren was generated until it was cleared on the system. A Microsoft™ 188 
Excel™ spreadsheet was prepared to structure the findings obtained from the field studies and 189 
to provide time-line data of the ECR operator’s interaction with the control setting while alarm 190 
handling. The observational checklist was time-stamped and allowed structuring alarm related 191 
activities and use of various artefacts within specific time frames, this enabled a sequential 192 
understanding of the alarm handling process. Table 2 shows an example of the spreadsheet. This 193 
spreadsheet facilitated an understanding of the use of various artefacts used while handling an 194 
alarm. Furthermore, since the checklist was time stamped, it was possible to estimate the 195 
amount of time each artefact was used, as well as the sequence of use. 196 
(Table 2) 197 
The time stamping divides each alarm handling episode into 15 second time frames. In each 198 
time frame the use of artefacts was assessed. For example, it was noted if, during the first 15 199 
seconds of alarm handling, the operators were on the phone as well as talking to a colleague in 200 
the control room (classified as ‘Face to Face’). Measurements of the occupancy of operators 201 
with each of the artefacts provided an understanding of their importance at any given time in the 202 
alarm handling process. The total use and overall time used for each artefact were recorded on 203 
the checklist. Additionally, operators were asked to comment on the amount of information 204 
presented to them and this comment was also recorded on the spreadsheet. 205 
2.2.3. PROCEDURE 206 
Four sessions of 4.5 hours each (two day shifts and two night shifts) were planned with the 207 
operators. The operators’ activities and the use of artefacts when handling real-time alarms 208 
(both expected and unexpected) were recorded and analysed in detail.  209 
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When an alarm was generated the researcher started the video recording and noted the artefacts 210 
utilised during the alarm handling episode in the observational checklist (these observations 211 
were verified through the video recordings). When the alarm was cleared, the operator informed 212 
the researcher and that he is ready to answer questions (retrospective verbal protocol). The 213 
researcher then annotated the observational checklist based on this information. These questions 214 
were also addressed to explore operators coping strategies (Table 1). The strategies were 215 
defined to and discussed with operators throughout the familiarisation phase, they were then 216 
referred to further during the verbal protocol session and were directly asked to select a relevant 217 
strategy (from the list on Table 1) associated with the activities noted. 218 
During the time when no alarms were being observed, the researcher engaged in additional 219 
discussion with the operators about their work, and made observations regarding general 220 
activities in the control room. This qualitative information from the operators help to develop a 221 
wider understanding of activities performed within the ECR. 222 
3. FINDINGS 223 
3.1. FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW 224 
ECR operators have two main responsibilities; the first is to monitor the status of the electrical 225 
supply. If there is loss of power on the railway tracks, the operator is notified by the SCADA 226 
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems), and proceeds with the appropriate 227 
rectifying procedure.  228 
Electrical Control Room Operators (ECROs) are in communication with signallers (i.e. 229 
dispatchers) and inform them that the railway tracks have electrical supplies. Moreover, they 230 
communicate with maintenance staff to ensure them that railway tracks are isolated and safe for 231 
track workers to conduct any work on site. This is conducted through a three-way 232 
communication system to assist with the accuracy of the procedure. During major incidents (e.g. 233 
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over head line failures) this communication is extended to train managers, and route managers 234 
to provide information regarding the estimated time of availability of the service and allow 235 
signallers to plan their regulating and re-routing activities.  236 
The second function is to manage and plan the isolation of the tracks when a maintenance team 237 
needs to work on the track. This also involves programming the isolations and switching circuit 238 
breakers, informing the maintenance team, as well as the signaller controlling that area, about 239 
the status of the track and whether it is safe for track access, or operational for traffic.  240 
Operators are usually occupied with other activities when an alarm occurs (e.g. programming 241 
isolation work, communicating with relevant in track workers regarding an on-going 242 
engineering work, etc.). The electrical control domain is highly dependent on successful alarm 243 
handling to maintain continuity of the service while at the same time identifying spurious false 244 
alarms that are either generated through testing and maintenance work, or for unknown reasons.  245 
3.2. RAIL ECR ALARMS  246 
Rail ECR alarms are events configured in the system that require the operator’s attention, 247 
following any form of abnormality in the rail network’s electrical supply system (e.g. through 248 
AC overhead wires or DC third rail). They are announced by an audible alarm and the updating 249 
of any related symbols on an alarm banner, as well as the provision of live indications on the 250 
SCADA display.   251 
ECR A is a typical Electrical Control Room covering heavy rail infrastructure in the urban 252 
London area. It has three workstations (Figure 1) and similar information available to all three. 253 
The SCADA display in the ECR was developed on the basis of Network Rail’s system 254 
specification recommendations 
27
 and it corresponds to EEMUA standards 
28
.  255 
There are four information displays on each workstation: the left screen displays the main track 256 
overview, the centre left screen displays the DC (Direct Current) overview and the centre right 257 
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screen, which is used for alarm handling, contains all of the operational displays. Finally, the 258 
right screen displays the AC (Alternating Current) overview and the AC connectivity page.  259 
These information displays contain numerous duplications, which is often used as a source for 260 
confirmation for operators. For example when there is a circuit breaker failure, the operator can 261 
compare the alterations on the AC and DC information display to determine the extent of the 262 
failure (e.g. grid level).  From the four displays, the operational display has the most interaction 263 
points. This is where isolations can be implemented and alarms can be explored and assessed. In 264 
other words the three remaining displays are for providing information and the operational 265 
display is for executing operational decisions.  266 
(Figure 2) 267 
Two ECR operators are active at one time and the third workstation is used for emergencies, 268 
when extra staff are required. Of the two workstations, one of the operators is considered to be 269 
in charge and acts as a supervisor. Apart from dynamic information displays on their desks, 270 
there is also a static board covering one wall of the ECR. This board shows the links and 271 
platforms of the area under control. Although the board is now out-dated in some ways, some of 272 
the less experienced operators use this to familiarise themselves with the area. 273 
According to NR specifications, one of the features of ECR alarms is that they have been 274 
prioritised by a ranking system, with six being the lowest priority alarm and one being the 275 
highest. System failures are always priority six and the rest of the alarm priorities are 276 
configurable by the engineers.  277 
Any unacknowledged alarm appears on the alarm banner, which is located on the operational 278 
display. The alarm banner can contain up to seven alarms and, if there is more than that at one 279 
time, an arrow is displayed at the right hand side in the colour of the highest priority alarm not 280 
displayed (Figure 3). If the cursor is placed over an outstation alarm button and the mouse is 281 
clicked, the outstation schematic page will be displayed, from which the alarm can be accepted. 282 
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Once the alarm is accepted by the operator as a true fault, that outstation name will be removed 283 
from the alarm banner panel to be replaced with another outstation with an unaccepted alarm, 284 
should there have been more than seven outstations with an unaccepted alarm. 285 
(Figure 3) 286 
During the familiarisation phase, it became apparent that operators had to deal with two types of 287 
alarms, referred to as ‘expected’ and ‘unexpected’ alarms. Maintenance procedures on the track 288 
can cause abnormalities and, consequently, a series of alarms will be generated in the control 289 
room. However, in these cases the operators are likely to be expecting the alarm, as they know 290 
the schedule and details of the maintenance being carried out on the track. Therefore, these 291 
alarms would not surprise the operators. This is obviously different to cases when the operators 292 
are not expecting the alarm and the alarm therefore alerts them to a new problem. 293 
Not surprisingly, operators noted information deficiencies as one of the challenges associated 294 
with their alarm handling.  Alarms can have ‘high information’ or ‘low information’. ‘High 295 
information’ refers to cases in which there is excessive information and the operator is 296 
overloaded with unnecessary information (e.g. duplications of sources of information). ‘Low 297 
information’ refers to cases in which the operator does not have sufficient information to 298 
diagnose and handle the alarm. It should be noted that these terms refer to operators’ subjective 299 
interpretations of the situation, since it was not possible to objectively assess the sufficiency and 300 
relevancy of the information presented to operators during real-time alarm handling. 301 
Other usability issues that were noted by operators included system lag when they wanted to 302 
close circuit breakers in order to prepare for an isolation. If there were a number of circuit 303 
breakers they had to be modified sequentially since the SCADA would not allow synchronised 304 
switching. This was not the case with previous electro-mechanical mimic diagrams. Another 305 
usability issue related to the implementing last minute alterations to the maintenance plans, 306 
14 
 
which introduced some level of cognitive demand since the operator had to reverse the existing 307 
isolation, permits and implement new ones within a pressured time frame.  308 
3.3. ALARM-INITIATED ACTIVITIES  309 
Review of the qualitative information collected during the verbal protocol analysis led to 310 
identification of activities associated with alarm handling. Operators comments were video 311 
recorded and transcribed (~7000 words) and were thematically analysed [29], Table 3 presents 312 
three examples (two unexpected alarms and one expected alarms) of this coding activity.  313 
(Table 3) 314 
Four high level activities were identified: Notification, acceptance, analysis and clearance.  315 
The first stage of alarm handling is ‘notification’, this the first instant were the operator notices 316 
the alarm. Any unacknowledged alarm appears on the alarm banner, which is located on the 317 
operational display, shown in Figure 3. The information provided includes the colour of the 318 
banner, the category of alarm which roughly indicates the type of failure.  319 
The second stage is ‘acceptance’. This refers to the activities that are conducted by the operator 320 
to ensure that the alarm is not a false one. If the cursor is placed over an outstation alarm button 321 
and the mouse is clicked, the outstation schematic page will be displayed, from which the alarm 322 
can be accepted. Once the alarm is accepted by the operator as a true fault, that outstation name 323 
will be removed from the alarm banner panel to be replaced with another outstation with an 324 
unaccepted alarm, should there have been more than seven outstations with an unaccepted 325 
alarm. 326 
Usually this is conducted by consulting other sources of information to confirm the existence of 327 
an actual failure, in case of expected alarms, because the operator is aware of the existing work 328 
going in the area, he usually does not need to consult other sources. This increases the risk of 329 
missing the unexpected alarms that are generated in the same area as other engineering works.  330 
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The third stage ‘analysis’, consists of the process that is conducted by the operator to analyse 331 
the causes of the failure, diagnose and investigate potential corrective actions. Operators consult 332 
a number of situational information including previous faults reported at the location, recent 333 
engineering work, status of the service (i.e. peak time/off peak), and availability of maintenance 334 
staff to access the faulty area and perform diagnostic investigation.  335 
The last stage is ‘clearance’. This refers to a series of activities conducted to select the most 336 
optimum corrective action. Optimum in this context would relate to “smart” way of dealing with 337 
the faulty situation, for example to know which maintenance team is closer to the failure site or 338 
to inform the route managers with an accurate estimated time of availability and facilitate better 339 
regulation. Operators should consider the impact of the failure on safety and efficiency of the 340 
service, plan the corrective action (i.e. when to send electrical technicians on track) and to 341 
inform relevant parties (e.g. signallers) of the fault. Note must be taken that clearance does not 342 
refer to complete rectification of the failure but indicates that a plan has been established to 343 
rectify the failure.  344 
Operators commented their key challenge was to focus on alarms while they were fully 345 
occupied with other responsibilities. This is particularly the case during the peak times when the 346 
operator felt pressured in resuming the service back to normal as soon as possible without 347 
compromising safety. Additionally, during the night shifts when alarms are generally caused by 348 
planned maintenance work, operators commented on the risk of overlooking a situation due to 349 
presuming that it is caused by the maintenance work.  350 
3.4. USE OF ARTEFACTS DURING ALARM HANDLING  351 
The following artefacts were utilised by operators whilst alarm handling:  352 
 SCADA display features 353 
o Menu 354 
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o Alarm banner 355 
o Display area 356 
o Page buttons 357 
o Overview display  358 
 Static board 359 
 Paper 360 
 Phone  361 
 Face to face communication. 362 
Although face to face communication is more of a social activity than physical one, it has been 363 
considered as an artefact here since this form of communication represents an important source 364 
of information for operators; neglecting it would lead to gaps in the activity analysis.  365 
In total, 22 alarm episodes were observed; of which 11 were unexpected and 11 were expected 366 
(e.g. triggered by testing or maintenance). Completion of the observation checklist allowed a 367 
crude estimation to be made of the degree to which various displays were used during episodes 368 
of alarm management. For example, in one episode captured in Table 2, twelve uses of different 369 
information displays and other artefacts were noted.  370 
Furthermore, operators were subjectively asked to identify the alarm types as ‘high information’ 371 
and ‘low information’. It must be noted that only unexpected alarms were considered for this 372 
categorisation. From the total of 11 unexpected alarm episodes, six were categorised as high 373 
information and five were categorised as low information alarms.  374 
Table 4 present the duration, mean and SD of the expected and unexpected alarms. Looking 375 
through the utilisation of various artefacts during expected and unexpected alarms (Table 5) 376 
showed that during unexpected alarm “display area” is mostly used and during expected alarm, 377 
“telephone” is the mostly used artefact. This is potentially due to the fact that during an 378 
expected alarm operator is talking to the maintenance team to confirm various issues while 379 
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interacting with the SCADA, whereas during unexpected alarm, operators would consult the 380 
operational display to investigate potential causes of the alarm.  381 
 (Table 4) and (Table 5) 382 
An independent sample t-test was used for the statistical analysis. The use of telephones and the 383 
display area were found to be significantly different, depending on the type of alarm. There was 384 
a significant difference between the number of times operators used the telephone in unexpected 385 
(M=0.131, SD=0.340) and expected conditions (M=0.592, SD=0.050); t (86) =-5.044, P<0.01. 386 
Also there was a significant difference between the number of times operators interacted with 387 
the display area in unexpected (M=0.524, STD=0.503) and expected (M=0.222, STD=0.423) 388 
conditions; t (86) = 2.721, p<0.01. 389 
In order to investigate the differences in the use of artefacts between high information (M=0.38, 390 
STD=0.49) and low information (M=0.84, STD=0.37), an independent samples t-test was 391 
applied.  The results revealed that the display area attendance is significantly higher in alarms 392 
with high information; t (59) = -3.63, p<0.01.  393 
3.5. COPING STRATEGIES 394 
Operators viewed Table 1 (the list of coping strategies) prior to the retrospective verbal protocol 395 
and were asked to identify their coping strategies during the alarm-handling episode. The 396 
coping strategies identified are:  397 
 Queuing 398 
 Filtering and categorising 399 
 Similarity matching  400 
 Extrapolation 401 
 Trial and error    402 
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These strategies were adopted at different stages of an alarm-handling episode. The time-403 
stamped observational checklist facilitated the correspondence of the alarm-initiated activity to 404 
the selected coping strategies.  405 
Operators notice the alarm from various information sources. These include: the flashing alarm 406 
banner, colour codes, acronyms of alarm type and location, sirens, phone calls, a flashing circle 407 
around the location on the overview display, etc. Operators have to categorise and filter these 408 
sources to achieve a basic understanding of the alarm. In the case of multiple alarms, operators 409 
queue them, based on their experience. Queuing often depends on the type of alarm and the 410 
location of the failed asset to identify potential impact on the service. The prioritisation is 411 
mainly based on ensuring safety and reducing delays on the railway service.   412 
In the rare cases of an alarm where immediate on-site action is required, operators use their 413 
knowledge of the track, the electrical equipment, the work that might be taking place out there 414 
and the train service running, as well as their experience of previous similar cases in order to 415 
assess the criticality of the alarm. The strategy at this stage is mostly similarity matching, which 416 
is highly related to operators’ experience. Usually, this stage is tightly coupled with the analysis 417 
and assessment of the alarm.  418 
Information presented to the operator is being used by them for the purpose of assessing and 419 
evaluating the underlying meaning and causes of alarms. Operators generally analyse alarms by 420 
stretching the existing evidence to match them with similar cases (extrapolation). Unlike 421 
similarity matching, where all of the evidence is matched with a similar previous alarm, here the 422 
operator has to use their imagination to fill the gaps until a similarity is perceived. 423 
The operator identifies possible courses of action, evaluates them and executes the optimum 424 
action to clear the alarm. The operator remembers similar cases and tries to match the stretched 425 
evidence to other potential (similarity matching and extrapolation) causes and trials the 426 
corrective actions of those cases (trial and error). 427 
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4. SYNTHESIS AND INPUT TO DESIGN  428 
Integration of the time-stamped observational checklist, with the strategy analysis, facilitated an 429 
understanding of operator work process and their shortcuts, biases and artefacts. This would 430 
allow development of design guidance for similar work settings. It must be noted that the 431 
emphasis of this section is on ‘unexpected alarms’ as they need to be analysed within often a 432 
time pressured situation and could benefit from some form of design aid. It should also be noted 433 
that while the number of observed alarms was small, there was much additional discussion with 434 
operators about how representative each incident was, and reflection from the operators on other 435 
alarm handling incidents. This broader data collection, which effectively formed an information 436 
cognitive task analysis, also contributed to design. 437 
Figure 4 shows the order and duration of activities when handling unexpected alarm episode. 438 
Not surprisingly, there is an order in occurrence of these activities: 1- notification, acceptance, 439 
analysis and clearance. An interesting point revealed that lengthy alarm handling episodes (e.g. 440 
episode 1, 4 and 10 on Figure 4) had spent longer periods on analysis and clearance and were 441 
triggered by some form of information complexity (i.e. high information in the case of alarm 442 
episode 1 and low information in the case alarm episode 4). For example during alarm handling 443 
episode 4, the operator had to investigate a number of possible causes that has led to the alarm. 444 
Once the operator identified the type and priority of the alarm and selected the appropriate 445 
operational page, he had to explore three possible routes in order to detect the affected circuit 446 
breaker that led to the alarm. Upon analysis of the alarm, the operator had to close the circuit 447 
breaker one by one and test the impact, the system did not allow simultaneous closure of the 448 
circuit breakers and it took longer than expected to clear the alarm.  449 
Similar mapping activity across time stamped observational checklist and the selected coping 450 
strategies informed the adopted duration of each of the strategies and their order (Figure 5).  451 
Similar to the previous figure, it was observed that the order of strategies is also consistent. This 452 
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would imply that coping strategies are not mutually exclusive across various activities. 453 
Therefore, it is possible to assume that for each of the activities there are certain coping 454 
strategies adopted by the operators and hence supporting/aiding/guiding that particular strategy 455 
would assist the operator in a particular phase of the alarm handling.  456 
Integrating the findings noted in the previous sections has led to Table 6. The table summarises 457 
the most critical design guidance that emerged to inform the development of effective alarm 458 
management in future electrical control for the railways. For example to improve alarm 459 
notification, alarm banners should be designed in a way that easily facilitates filtering and 460 
categorising of the data. Local knowledge and historical information should be available to 461 
assist operators in accepting alarms with confidence. Previous alarm episodes and similar 462 
situations should be available to enable operators to diagnose and clear alarms, as they often 463 
extrapolate the available evidence to match that of previous situations. 464 
5. DISCUSSION  465 
This paper reported a series of studies that was performed to establish an understanding of alarm 466 
handling in ECR and to apply this understanding to guide the design of effective alarm 467 
management systems. A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods was adopted to 468 
identify operators’ activities and strategies while handling alarms. This provided a detailed 469 
insight into alarm handling and facilitated guiding alarm systems in the future intelligent 470 
infrastructure systems. 471 
Strategies such as similarity matching and extrapolation are related to the operator’s experience 472 
and local knowledge as it was found from their comments. Alarm systems should be designed to 473 
provide better support, for instance, by providing historical and statistical information relevant 474 
to the alarm. The potential risks are also demonstrated – for example, extrapolation may lead 475 
operators to apply inappropriate prior knowledge. Extrapolation is often used as the basis for 476 
clearing alarms, with the risk that an inappropriate match being made between the current case 477 
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and previous experiences. Therefore, local knowledge and historical information should be 478 
available to assist operators in accepting alarms with confidence.  479 
One particular finding of the study is the comparison between expected and unexpected alarms. 480 
The alarm banner, the display area and the menu on the operational display are the three most 481 
used artefacts for handling ‘unexpected’ alarms. On the other hand, the alarm banner and the 482 
telephone are the most utilised artefacts while operators are handling ‘expected’ alarms. The 483 
reason for this difference is that, in the case of an expected alarm, operators only need to verify 484 
and confirm an expected event through either a telephone call from a member of the 485 
maintenance team or an updated alarm banner. Having said that, operators’ expecting an alarm 486 
(due to an on-going engineering work), does not necessarily mean that the next alarm occurring 487 
is known and does not need any diagnosis.  ECROs commented on situations where unexpected 488 
alarms occurred and were attributed to ongoing engineering work at the time and in the relevant 489 
area. Had they not notice the difference promptly; the misidentification would have lead to 490 
major issues.  491 
Another important finding of this study relates to the comparison between high and low 492 
information alarms. When operators are faced with low information, they use the display area 493 
almost twice as much as in cases of high information. However, the overall duration of handling 494 
high information alarms is twice as long as low information alarms. This could suggest that 495 
operators are a lot better at finding the missing information on the operational display than 496 
categorising and filtering the high amount of information presented to them. Another way of 497 
explaining this is that current systems are not very good at categorising and filtering 498 
information, which should also be a concern for the design of future alarm displays.  499 
One major surprise from this work was the relatively few instances of alarms that actually took 500 
place. Despite the 18 hours of field study, only 22 alarms were generated, and discussion with 501 
operators revealed that, particularly during the night shift, this kind of workload was fairly 502 
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typical. This would suggest some broader human factors implications with the ECRO role, in 503 
that at periods of low workload there are probably issues around vigilance 
30
. At the other 504 
extreme, managing alarms during the peak hours became one of workload in conjunction with 505 
other tasks. This suggests that future HF work in the ECRO environment could be targeted to 506 
understanding more generally the working conditions and varying cognitive demands of the 507 
role.  508 
This study, although among the first to review the ECR domain and develop an understanding 509 
of alarm handling in railway ECR, has its limitations. These arose mainly from the resources 510 
available to the study and the challenges of real-life research. One particular challenge was the 511 
small number of alarms observed, which might seem insufficient. However, video recordings of 512 
operators while handling alarms and interviews with them after the handling (verbal protocol) 513 
facilitated the study of alarms from various perspectives and led to findings pertinent to the 514 
objectives of this study. Also, as noted above, this left much time for discussion around the 515 
typicality of the alarms observed, and this kind of frequency, while restricting data was 516 
representative and therefore should gave an accurate context in which to observe and elicit 517 
strategies.  518 
The relatively small number of participants can also be considered to be a limitation in this 519 
study, it must be noted that the six railway operators involved with this study were all working 520 
in ECR A and comprised 50% of the work force in that ECR. Also, this ECR was selected under 521 
guidance from senior management because of its typical nature. Furthermore, the core aim of 522 
this study was to explore the activities and strategies adopted by operators while interacting 523 
with the existing SCADA system. Finally, in identifying HMI issues with the existing SCADA 524 
system, the approach was to identify the general feel towards the role of SCADA in relation to 525 
performance and strategy over an extended period of time, rather than to compare and contrast 526 
subtle design elements (which would have required a larger participant body).  527 
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6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 528 
The work presented in this study indicates the complexities of alarm handling domains. While it 529 
is no doubt the aspiration of infrastructure operators to develop new environments and new 530 
working patterns for future prognostic and health monitoring systems, the reality is that many 531 
new technologies will need to be integrated with legacy technology, and / or legacy processes. 532 
This paper gives an overview of the cognitive characteristics of work in one potential health 533 
monitoring domain, railway electrical control. Importantly, the data highlights the heuristics and 534 
biases are present in all aspects of alarm handling. It is important to stress that heuristics are not 535 
shortcomings or workarounds on the part of an operator, but a fundamental characteristic of 536 
human cognition present in huge range to human activity, and should not be ignored, but 537 
acknowledged and designed for in a sensitive manner 
16
.  538 
Additionally, study reported in this paper recommends a series of methodologies and 539 
approaches that facilitates understanding of complex control settings, their work domain, 540 
constraints and operational heuristics.  The framework of methodologies, data collection and 541 
analysis techniques utilised during this study can potentially inform systematic reviews of alarm 542 
management system within complex control settings such as railways, nuclear, process, etc. 543 
This can ideally be part of the Human Factors integration planning activities conducted prior to 544 
commissioning alarm management systems; the advantage of this inclusion is that it 545 
incorporates knowledge of possible cognitive demands, along with physical and conditional 546 
constraints, into design and testing.  Future work is required to explore this combination of 547 
sequential and contextual methods further and provide a human factors engineering program 548 
plan for design and procurement to assist them with better understanding of their complex 549 
infrastructure management environments.  550 
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8. TABLES  634 
TABLE 1: COPING STRATEGIES FOR INFORMATION INPUT OVERLOAD AND INFORMATION INPUT 635 
UNDERLOAD (TAKEN FROM HOLLNAGEL & WOODS 2005, P. 80-81) 636 
Strategy  Definition 
Omission Temporary, arbitrary non-processing of information; 
information is lost 
Reduced precision  Trading precision for speed and time, all input is 
considered, but only superficially; reasoning is 
shallower 
Queuing  Delaying response during high load, on the assumption 
that it will be possible to catch-up later (stacking input) 
Filtering  Neglecting to process certain categories; non-processed 
information is lost  
Cutting categories  Reducing the level of discrimination; using fewer 
grades or categories to describe input  
Decentralisation  Distributing processing if possible; calling in assistance  
Escape Abandoning the task; giving up completely; leaving the 
field 
Extrapolation Existing evidence is ‘stretched’ to fit a new situation; 
extrapolation is usually linear, and is often based on 
fallacious causal reasoning  
Frequency gambling  The frequency of occurrence of past items/ events are 
used as a basis for recognition/ selection  
Similarity matching  The subjective similarity of past to present items/event 
is used as a basis for recognition/selection 
Trial-and-error (random 
selection) 
Interpretations and/ or selection do not follow any 
systematic principle 
Laissez-faire An independent strategy is given up in place of just 
doing what others do  
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TABLE 2: OBSERVATIONAL CHECKLIST FILLED FOR ONE ALARM EPISODE 
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0:00:01 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 Notificati
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ce 
High 
information  
0:00:16 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 Analysis   
0:00:30 0 0 0 0    0  Clearance   
Total-time of 
use(seconds)  
0 0 22.5 7.5 3.75 3.75 3.75 0 3.75     
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TABLE 3: THEMATIC ANALYSIS OF ALARM HANDLING QUALITATIVE FINDINGS 
Alarm  Notification Acceptance Analysis  Clearance 
Unexpected 
5 
It took 3 seconds for the 
operator to look at the alarm and 
grab the mouse and 
acknowledge the alarm by 
clicking on the operational 
display.  
And another 4 second to load 
the new page where caused the 
alarm.  Operator explains that: 
all we get is the alarm banner, 
we then look at the overview 
and grab the information and 
decide what is wrong, it's like 
second nature. When you are 
looking at the colour, you think 
what category alarm it is and 
you know what is the priority of 
each category and what are the 
things associated with the 
potential causes of the alarms 
Operator noted that once you get 
here it could be anything. There 
is no way we can tell what the 
problem is. But in this case it is 
a trip charge. It just dropped a 
lot of threshold and its gone 
back to normal now. And now I 
am checking another page to 
check the threshold on another 
location and when I see that is 
also lo, it confirms my 
hypothesis.  
I increase the threshold and 
rectify the problem and then 
ensure that the area is covered 
and safe.  
30 
 
based on the categories.  
Unexpected 
7 
Audible siren is activated. 4 
seconds after that operator clicks 
on the alarm banner. 
He says: looks like one of the 
breakers has failed, he accept 
and silence the alarm. 
4 seconds after and he conclude 
that both of the breakers have 
failed, he spent another 15 
seconds looking at the alarm and 
its indication to work out what 
is the problem He opens the 
event log and try to find the 
breakers on the screen and then 
go through the events. He 
reviews the facts presented on 
And then tries to close the 
circuit breaker, but the system is 
not very responsive and he use a 
shortcut on the system to shut 
down breakers.  
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the event log.  
Expected 1 There are multiple alarms, but 
that is just because I set the 
testing like that.  
Then because I know what it is, 
I accept the alarm.  
I know exactly what has caused 
this alarm, but also from 
reviewing of the alarm 
categories my expectation is 
confirmed.  
I correct the fault through 
SCADA and log the event.  
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TABLE 4: DURATION OF 11 UNEXPECTED AND 11 EXPECTED ALARMS  
            Total Mean SD 
Unexpected 
Alarm ID 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11    
Duration  152 67.5 30 134.55 29.85 60 89.7 59.7 74.7 104.9 60 862.7 78.42727 39.07759 
Expected 
Alarm ID 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11    
Duration  15 44.9 15 39.75 15 15 15 15 15 29.85 30 249.45 41.575 11.40509 
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TABLE 5: ALARM ARTEFACTS UTILISED DURING EXPECTED AND UNEXPECTED ALARM  
Unexpected tell F2F  alarm 
banner 
Menu Display area Page 
button 
cntrl 
overview board paper 
Mean  0.906818 0.302273 13.21818 14.31818 29.23409 10.7 6.022727 0 3.956818 
Expected  tell F2F  alarm 
banner 
Menu Display area Page 
button 
cntrl 
overview board paper 
Mean  7.015909 0 7.038068 2.243182 1.924431818 0.73125 2.243182 0 0.085227 
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TABLE 6: ALARM INITIATED ACTIVITIES AND THEIR CORRESPONDING ARTEFACTS AND STARTEGIES 
Activity  Main artefact  Strategies Design guidance  
Notification   Alarm banner  Filtering 
Categorising  
-The information presented 
on the alarm banner should 
be coded so that it is easy 
to filter. 
-Codify the types of alarm 
to facilitate categorising.  
Acceptance Alarm banner 
Display area 
Categorising  
Similarity matching  
-On the alarm banner, mark 
the alarm to tell the 
operator that there are 
similar previous cases.  
-On the display area, 
provide information about 
the similar previous cases. 
This is to ensure that 
operators have a clear 
overview of the alarm and 
do not automatically accept 
it because of some 
similarities between this 
alarm and some previous 
cases. 
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9. FIGURES  
 
 
Analysis  Display area 
Menu 
Overview 
Extrapolation 
Similarity matching  
-On the display area 
provide details of previous 
cases and also facilitate 
playing back the alarm 
situation. 
Clearance  Menu 
Display area 
Overview 
Provide clearance  -Provide clearance options 
and ultimately potential 
outcomes of these courses 
of action according to 
previous cases (e.g. their 
delay contribution, etc.)  
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FIGURE 1: LAYOUT OF ECR A 
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FIGURE 2: ECR WORKSTATION IN ECR A (UK) 
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FIGURE 3: OPERATIONAL DISPLAY 
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FIGURE 4: ORDER OF ALARM HANDLING ACTIVITIES FOR UNEXPECTED ALARMS  
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FIGURE 5: ORDER OF ALARM HANDLING STRATEGIES FOR UNEXPECTED ALARMS 
 
 
